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Monday, February 2, 2015

43.2.3.1.j The Battle of Isandlwana 22nd January 1879 The Players - Newspaper articles- Time for Blame


The inclusion of the information regarding the Battle of Isandlwana, and the sources used to compile it, has been done for the benefit of those who may be familiar with either this Battle involving their ancestor, nor the subsequent outcomes and events and to provide a balanced viewpoint of what has been recorded as a piece of very important Military History.

There are numerous books written about the Zulu Wars, in about 90% of them  Anthony is the reason for the loss by the British.       Unfortunately what has been printed stays around for a long time. 



While the 22nd January,1879 results in the death of so many, for Col Anthony Durnford, possibly unlike most of the others, his story is just about to begin!


Portrail of Col Durnford's last stand
.

But first a snippet from one of our Australian Durnford uncles's as told to a cousin:

"I just remembered something my uncle Jack told me about Anthony's demise. He said that it was his troop of black riflemen that killed him, when the chips were down they turned on him". 

Is it any wonder that the truth gets lost through the generations?    

Anthony was killed by a Zulu, but he wasn't one of his loyal riflemen!

And from a Canadian cousin, "I watched the movie Zulu, and I couldn't see how he could have been blamed."

And another in England,  "I always thought it was .........................., who was to blame"


Isandlwana

Failure to comply with the Government Orders.

Cetshwayo had not responded by the end of the year, so an extension was granted by Bartle Frere until 11 January 1879. Cetshwayo returned no answer to the preposterous demands of Bartle Frere, and in January 1879 a British force under Lieutenant General Frederick Augustus Thesiger, 2nd Baron Chelmsford invaded Zululand, without authorisation by the British Government.

Lord Chelmsford, the Commander-in-Chief of British forces during the war, initially planned a five-pronged invasion of Zululand composed of over 15,000 troops in five columns and designed to encircle the Zulu army and force it to fight as he was concerned that the Zulus would avoid battle.

In the event, Chelmsford settled on three invading columns with the main center column, now consisting of some 7800 men comprising the previously called No. 3 Column and Durnford's No.2 Column, under his direct command.

He moved his troops from Pietermaritzburg to a forward camp at Helpmekaar, past Greytown. On 9 January 1879 they moved to Rorke's Drift, and early on 11 January commenced crossing the Buffalo River into Zululand.

Three columns were to invade Zululand, from the Lower Tugela, Rorke's Drift, and Utrecht respectively, their objective being Ulundi, the royal capital.

Memorandum of Lord Chelmsford    His Plan


It is desirable for the sake of justice that the plans of Lord Chelmsford in commencing the campaign should be given in his own words. They are contained in a memorandum dated 16th January, 1879, and are as follows:—

"The reports which I receive from officers commanding the several columns now operating against Cetywayo show clearly that at this season of the year a rapid advance into the heart of Zululand is absolutely impossible.

"The present state of the roads in Natal will be sufficient to bring home to the mind of every one what difficulties must stand in the way of those who are endeavouring to move forward into the enemy's country, over tracts which have never been traversed, except by a very few traders' wagons.
Lord Chelmsford's plans.

"No. 3 column at Rorke's Drift cannot possibly move forward even eight miles, until two swamps, into which our waggons sank up to the body, have been made passable.
"This work will occupy us for at least four days, and we shall find similar obstacles in front of us, in every march we are anxious to make.

"Accepting the situation, therefore, it remains for me to determine what modification of the plan of campaign at first laid down will be necessary.

"I consider that my original idea of driving, as far as possible, all the Zulus forward towards the north-east part of their country, is still thoroughly sound.

"Without, therefore, attempting to push forward faster than our means will admit of, I propose with Nos. 1, 2, and 3 columns to thoroughly clear or subjugate the country between the Buffalo and Tugela rivers and the Umhlatoosi river, by means of expeditions made by those columns from certain fixed positions.

"No. 1 column will, as already instructed, occupy Etshowe.

"Instead, however, of crossing the Umhlatoosi river to Mr. Samuelson's mission station (St. Paul's), it will move a portion of its force to Entumeni, and occupy that position as well as Etshowe.

"Having established itself firmly in those two positions, the main object of this column will be to clear the Inkandhla bush and forest, or to induce the chiefs and headmen of the tribes residing or specially stationed in that part of the country to tender their submission.

"No. 3 column will first advance to a position near the Inkandhla hill, and from there, assisted by a portion of No. 2 column, will clear the Equideni forest, or induce the chiefs, etc., to submit.

"This work completed, the portion of No. 2 column under Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford will move towards the mission station near the Empand-leni hill, whilst No. 3 column advances to a fresh position near the Isipezi hill, detaching, if necessary, part of its force to support No. 2 column.

"These combined moves will, I hope, have the effect of removing any dangerously large body from the Natal border.

"Colonel Wood, commanding No. 4 column, has been informed of these intended movements, and has been instructed to act together independently about the head waters of the White Umvoloosi river.

"When Cetywayo has either surrendered or been defeated, which can only take a few more days to decide, Colonel Wood will take up a position covering Utrecht and the adjacent Transvaal border, wherever he considers his force can be most usefully employed. He will not attempt to advance towards the Inhlazatze mountain until an advance by the other three columns across the Umhlatoosi river has become possible.

"By these movements I hope to be able to clear that portion of Zululand which is situated south of the Umhlatoosi river, and behind a straight line drawn from the head waters of that river to the head waters of the White Umvoloosi river.

"Should the Swazies come down to the Pongolo river, that part of Zululand which is behind a straight line drawn from the head waters of the Umvoloosi river to the junction of the Bevan and Pongolo rivers, will also, no doubt, be abandoned, and possibly as far as the Lebombo mountains.

"I trust that this plan of campaign will meet with the approval of the High Commissioner.
"From a military point of view I am convinced that it is the only practicable one at this time of year, and if successfully carried out, is capable of producing very satisfactory results.
"I am equally confident that, politically, it will also have good results.

"We shall occupy a large extent of Zululand, and shall threaten the portion which remains to the king. We shall completely cover the Natal border, and shall to a considerable extent do the same for the Transvaal.

We expect Cetywayo to keep his army mobilised, and it is clear his troops will have difficulty in finding sufficient supplies."

**********************************************************************************

Durnford was given command of No. 2 Column comprising the 1st Regiment, Natal Native Contingent (three battalions) and five troops of mounted Natives.

On 10 January Durnford led out the 1st and 2nd Battalions NNC, five of the six troops of the NNMC and Russell’s rocket battery. These were left at Sandspruit while Durnford, receiving fresh orders from Lord Chelmsford after riding up to Rorke’s Drift, returned to Kranskop with seven companies of the 1st Battalion, leaving the remaining three behind. These were combined into two over-size companies under two captains, the third captain having remained at Kranskop as paymaster.


Chelmsford directed Durnford to join the No3 Column with his mounted men and rocket battery and have the battalion watch "the gates of Natal" that is the border between Rorke's Drift and the Msinga mountain and in due course cross the river there.  The two battalians remaing at d'Almaine's farm were to cross at the Middle Drift as soon as the No1 Column reached Eshowe.

On the 13th two days after the expiry of the 'ultimatum' he advised Lord Chelmsford by means of a hurried note that he intended invading Zululand on the strength of information he had received that a Zulu impi was heading for Middle Drift below Kranskop.


The missionary had contacts  in the Zulu country and a good telescope.  The information seemed credible even though the river was too high for crossing on the 13th and few enemy were seen.

Spirits rose when they were ordered to move down to the crossing at daybreak on January 14th.  In fact Durnford was disobeying the LG instructons. He had told the LG that the Zulu forces opposite had left the border, but then the missionary at the station near Kranskop had informed him that they had returned in strength and were threatening to invade Natal.

Without waiting for approval, he set his troops in motion and might have marched straight to Ulundi, had he not received an angry note from the general ordering him back to his base and warning him that he would be relieved of his command if he once again disobeyed instructions.


The Lieutenant General did not see any threat.   He wrote sharply.
     
Dear Durnford,
Unless you carry out the instructions I give you, it will be my unpleasant duty to remove you from your command, and to substitute another officer for officer for the commander of No. 2 Column. 

When a column is acting SEPARATELY in an enemy's country I am quite ready to give its commander every latitude, and would certainly expect him to disobey any orders he might receive from me, if information which he obtained showed that it would be injurious to the interests of the column under his command.  

Your neglecting to obey my instructions in the present instance has no excuse.  You have simply received information in a letter from Bishop Schroeder[sic], which may or may not be true and which you have no means of verifying.  If movements ordered are to be delayed because report hints at a chance of an invasion of Natal, it will be impossible for me to carry out my plan of campaign.  I trust you will understand this plain speaking and not give me any further occasion to write in a style which is distasteful to me.
Chelmsford.

He then returned  to the camp, on the Greytown side of Kranskop village,  Kranskop lies close to the Thukela River, then the border between Natal and Zululand. There was a river-crossing at Kranskop known as Middle  Drift, hence the presence of the NNC regiment.

Thukela River



The main body of the No 2 Column remained at Kranskop.  The officers and men unaware of the Lieutenant General's changes of plan, still expected to invade Zululand by way of the Middle Drift.  

On 17 January, Durnford left Kranskop riding to Sandspruit.

On 20 January, Durnford's force was ordered to Rorke's Drift to support Chelmsford's column. That evening, a portion of the No. 2 Column under Durnford arrived at Rorke's drift and camped on the Zulu bank where it remained through the next day.

Late on the evening of 21 January, Durnford was ordered to Isandlwana, as was a small detachment of No. 5 Field Company, Royal Engineers, commanded by Lieutenant John Chard, which had arrived on the 19th to repair the pontoons which bridged the Buffalo.

There he left Bengough’s 2nd Battalion and took the remainder of his force on to Rorke’s Drift, arriving on the 20th, the same day that Lord Chelmsford and the 3rd Column marched out for Isandlwana. Captain Geoffry Barton, his Staff Officer, was left at Kranskop in command of the troops remaining there.

On the 20th of January, 1879, the camp of the third column was at the Isandhlwana mountain. This force was under the command of Colonel Glyn, C.B., and the general commanding had accompanied it from the Tugela river.

On the date just quoted, orders were given to Commandant Lonsdale and Major Dartnell to go out the following morning, and make a forward movement with a force composed of Native Contingent, Police, and Volunteers.

 On the next day (21st January), Major Dartnell sent in word that the enemy was near him in considerable force. Upon this Lord Chelmsford ordered the 2nd Battalion, 24th Regiment, the mounted infantry, and four guns, to be under arms at once, and this force left so soon as there was light enough to see the road. Before Lord Chelmsford left, he sent the following order to Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford, commanding No. 2 column:—"Move up to Isandhlwana camp at once with all your mounted men and rocket battery.

Take command of it. I am accompanying Colonel Glyn, who is moving off at once to attack Matyana and a Zulu force said to be twelve or fourteen miles off, and at present watched by Natal Police, Volunteers, and Natal Native Contingent. Colonel Glyn takes with him 2-24th Regiment, four guns R.A., and Mounted Infantry."

Major Clery, senior staff officer to the third column, says—"Before leaving the camp I sent written instructions to Colonel Pulleine, 24th Regiment, to the following effect:—'You will be in command of the camp during the absence of Colonel Glyn. Draw in' (I speak from memory) 'your camp, or your line of defence,'—I am not certain which—'while the force is out. Also draw in the line of your infantry outposts accordingly; but keep your cavalry vedettes still far advanced.'

I went to Colonel Pulleine's tent just before leaving camp, to ascertain that he had got those instructions, and I again repeated them verbally to him."

Chard rode ahead of his detachment to Isandlwana on the morning of 22 January to clarify his orders, but was sent back to Rorke's Drift with only his wagon and its driver to construct defensive positions for the expected reinforcement company, passing Durnford's column en route in the opposite direction.


 Captain Alan Gardiner, of the 14th Hussars, states that he left the camp with Lord Chelmsford on the 22nd of January, and was sent back into camp with an order from the general, between 10 and 11 a.m. that day.

Colonel Pulleine was informed that the camp of the force out was to be struck, and sent on immediately; "also rations and forage for about seven days."

Sources include www.victorianwars.com

http://www.britishbattles.com/zulu-war/isandlwana.htm
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Battle of Isandlwana                                                                 From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia    

This Battle occurred on 22nd January, 1879, and was regarded as the 
worst defeat of Queen Victoria's Army.


                                                                                                     
      
The British

Overall commander:
Lt. Gen. Lord Chelmsford



Subordinate commanders:
Bvt. Lt-Col. Henry Pulleine  
Bvt. Col. Anthony Durnford  

No.2 Column:
British: 14
Native + colonial: ca. 511
No.3 Column:
British: 734
Native + colonial: ca. 578
1,837 men total.
In addition to the troops above, an indeterminate number of civilians (wagon drivers, servants, etc.) were also present


Result British
Over 1,300 killed:
52 officers
727 British regulars
471 others including:
133 European Colonial troops
343 African Natal Native Contingent
2 artillery pieces captured


Zulu

Overall commander:                                                           
Ntshingwayo kaMahole Khoza
Subordinate commanders:
Vumindaba kaNthati
Mavumengwana kaMdlela
Zibhebhu kaMapitha


Zulu Impi:
about 20,000
ca. 10,000 to 15,000 engaged
Reserve:
4,000 to 5,000 to Rorke's Drift


Result

1,000 killed
2,000 wounded



The Battle of Isandlwana (alternative spelling: Isandhlwana) on 22 January 1879 was the first major encounter in the Anglo–Zulu War between the British Empire and the Zulu Kingdom.

Eleven days after the British commenced their invasion of Zululand in South Africa, a Zulu force of some 20,000 warriors attacked a portion of the British main column consisting of about 1,800 British, colonial and native troops and perhaps 400 civilians.

The Zulus were equipped mainly with the traditional assegai iron spears and cow-hide shields, but also had a number of muskets and old rifles though they were not formally trained in their use.

The British and colonial troops were armed with the state-of-the-art Martini-Henry breech-loading rifle and two 7-pounder (3-inch, 76 mm) mountain guns deployed as field guns  as well as a rocket battery. Despite a vast disadvantage in weapons technology, the numerically superior Zulus ultimately overwhelmed the poorly led and badly deployed British, killing over 1,300 troops, including all those out on the forward firing line. The Zulu army suffered around a thousand killed.

The battle was a decisive victory for the Zulus and caused the defeat of the first British invasion of Zululand. The British Army had suffered its worst defeat against a technologically inferior indigenous force.

Isandlwana resulted in the British taking a much more aggressive approach in the Anglo–Zulu War, leading to a heavily reinforced second invasion and the destruction of King Cetshwayo's hopes of a negotiated peace.

Background

Following the imperialist scheme by which Lord Carnarvon had brought about Confederation in Canada through the 1867 British North America Act, it was thought that a similar plan might succeed in South Africa and in 1877 and Sir Henry Bartle Frere was appointed as High Commissioner for Southern Africa to instigate the scheme.

 Some of the obstacles to such a plan were the presence of the independent states of the South African Republic and the Kingdom of Zululand, both of which the British Empire would attempt to overcome by force of arms.

Bartle Frere, High Commissioner for Southern Africa for the British Empire, on his own initiative, without the approval of the British government and with the intent of instigating a war with the Zulu, had presented an ultimatum to the Zulu king Cetshwayo on 11 December 1878 with which the Zulu king could not possibly comply. When the ultimatum expired a month later, Bartle Frere ordered Lord Chelmsford to proceed with a pre-planned invasion of Zululand.

Prelude

Lord Chelmsford, the Commander-in-Chief of British forces during the war, initially planned a five-pronged invasion of Zululand consisting of over 15,000 troops in five columns and designed to encircle the Zulu army and force it to fight as he was concerned that the Zulus would avoid battle.

Lord Chelmsford settled on three invading columns with the main centre column, now consisting of some 7,800 men comprising the previously called No. 3 Column, commanded by the Colonel of the 24th Richard Glynn, and Durnford's No.2 Column, under his direct command.

He moved his troops from Pietermaritzburg to a forward camp at Helpmekaar, past Greytown. On 9 January 1879 they moved to Rorke's Drift, and early on 11 January commenced crossing the Buffalo River into Zululand.

The backbone of the British force under Lord Chelmsford consisted of twelve regular infantry companies: six each of the 1st and 2nd battalions, 24th Regiment of Foot (2nd Warwickshire Regiment), which were hardened and reliable troops.

 In addition, there were approximately 2,500 local African auxiliaries of the Natal Native Contingent many of which were exiled or refugee Zulu. They were led by European officers but considered generally of poor quality by the British as they were prohibited from using their traditional fighting technique and inadequately trained in the European method as well as being indifferently armed.



Also, there were some irregular colonial cavalry units, and a detachment of artillery consisting of six field guns and several Congreve rockets.

 Adding on wagon drivers, camp followers and servants, there were more than 4,000 men in the Number 3 Column, not including Durnford's Number 2 Column. Because of the urgency required to accomplish their scheme, Bartle Frere and Chelmsford began the invasion during the rainy season.

This had the consequence of slowing the British advance to a crawl.

The Zulu army, while a product of a warrior culture, was essentially a militia force which could be called out in time of national danger. It had a very limited logistical capacity and could only stay in the field a few weeks before the troops would be obliged to return to their civilian duties.

Zulu warriors were armed primarily with assegai thrusting spears, known in Zulu as iklwa, knobkierrie clubs, some throwing spears and shields made of cowhide.

 The Zulu warrior, his regiment and the army drilled in the personal and tactical use and coordination of this weapons system. Some Zulus also had old muskets and antiquated rifles stockpiled, a relatively few of which were carried by Zulu impi.

However, their marksmanship was very poor, quality and supply of powder and shot dreadful, maintenance non-existent and attitude towards firearms summed up in the observation that: "The generality of Zulu warriors, however, would not have firearms – the arms of a coward, as they said, for they enable the poltroon to kill the brave without awaiting his attack."

The British had timed the invasion to coincide with the harvest, intending to catch the Zulu warrior-farmers dispersed. Fortuitously for Cetshwayo, the Zulu army had already begun to assemble at Ulundi, as it did every year for the First Fruits ceremony when all warriors were duty-bound to report to their regimental barracks near Ulundi.

Cetshwayo sent the 24,000 strong main Zulu impi from near present-day Ulundi, on 17 January, across the White Umfolozi River with the following command to his warriors:
"March slowly, attack at dawn and eat up the red soldiers."

On the 18th, some 4,000 warriors were detached from the main body to attack Pearson's column near Eshowe. The remaining 20,000 Zulus camped at the isiPhezi ikhanda. On the 19th the main force arrived and camped near Babanango Mountain, then moved the next day to a camp near Siphezi Mountain.

 Finally, on the 21st they moved into the Ngwebeni Valley, where they remained concealed, planning to attack the British on the 23rd, but they were discovered by a scouting party on 22 January.

Under the command of Ntshigwayo kaMahole the Zulu army had reached its position in easy stages. It marched in two columns within sight of each other, but a few miles apart to prevent a surprise attack. They were preceded by a screening force of mounted scouts supported by parties of warriors 200–400 strong tasked with preventing the main columns from being sighted.

 The speed of the Zulu advance compared to the British is marked. The Zulu impi had advanced over 80 km (50 mi) in five days while Chelmsford had only advanced slightly over 16 km (9.9 mi) in 10 days.

Chelmsford party marching towardsIsandlwana,
The British under Chelmsford pitched camp at Isandlwana on 20 January,but did not follow standing orders to entrench. No laager (circling of the wagons) was formed.

Chelmsford did not see the need for the laager, stating, "It would take a week to make." But the chief reason for the failure to take defensive precautions appears to have been that the British command severely underestimated the Zulu capabilities.

The experience of numerous colonial wars fought in Africa was that the massed firepower of relatively small bodies of professional European troops armed with modern firearms and artillery, and supplemented by local allies and levies, would march out to meet the natives whose ragged, badly equipped armies would put up a brave struggle, but in the end would succumb.

Chelmsford believed that a force of over 4,000, including 2,000 British infantry armed with Martini-Henry rifles, as well as artillery, had more than sufficient firepower to overwhelm any attack by Zulus armed only with spears, cowhide shields and a few firearms such as Brown Bess muskets.

Indeed, with a British force of this size, it was the logistical arrangements which occupied Chelmsford's thoughts. Rather than any fear that the camp might be attacked, his main concern was managing the huge number of wagons and oxen required to support his forward advance.

Once he had established the camp at Isandlwana, Chelmsford sent out two battalions of the Natal Native Contingent to scout ahead. They skirmished with elements of a Zulu force which Chelmsford believed to be the vanguard of the main enemy army.

Such was the overconfidence in British military training and firepower that he divided his force, taking about 2,500 men, including half of the British infantry contingent, and set out to find the main Zulu force with the intention of bringing them to battle, so as to achieve a decisive victory. It never occurred to Chelmsford that the Zulus he saw were diverting him from their main force.

Chelmsford left behind five companies, around 70–80 fighting men in each, of the 1st battalion and one stronger company of around 150 men from the 2nd battalion of the 24th to guard the camp, under the command of Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Henry Pulleine.

Pulleine's orders were to defend the camp and wait for further instructions to support the general as and when called upon. Pulleine also had around 500 men of the Natal Native Contingent and approximately 200 local mounted irregulars. He also had two artillery pieces, with around 70 men of the Royal Artillery. In total, some 1,300 men and two guns were left to defend the camp.

Pulleine, left in command of a rear position, was an administrator with no experience of front-line command on a campaign. Nevertheless, he commanded a strong force, particularly the six veteran regular infantry companies, which were experienced at colonial warfare.

The mounted vedettes, cavalry scouts, patrolling some 11 km (6.8 mi) from camp reported at 7:00am that groups of Zulus, numbering around 4,000 men, could be seen. Further reports arrived to Pulleine during the early morning, each reporting movements, both large and small, of Zulus. There was speculation among the officers whether these troops were intending to march against Chelmsford's rear or towards the camp itself.

Around 10:30am, Colonel Anthony Durnford arrived from Rorke's Drift with five troops of the Natal Native horse and a rocket battery. This brought the issue of command to the fore, because Durnford was senior and by tradition would have assumed command.

 However, he did not over-rule Pulleine's dispositions and after lunch he quickly decided to take to the initiative and move forward to engage a Zulu force which Pulleine and Durnford judged to be moving against Chelmsford's rear. Durnford asked for a company of the 24th, but Pulleine was reluctant to agree since his orders had been specifically to defend the camp.

Chelmsford had underestimated the disciplined, well-led, well-motivated and confident Zulu. The failure to secure an effective defensive position, the poor intelligence on the location of the main Zulu army, Chelmsford's decision to split his force in half, and the Zulus' tactical exploitation of the terrain and the weaknesses in the British formation, all combined to prove catastrophic for the troops at Isandlwana.

In contrast, the Zulus responded to the unexpected discovery of their camp with an immediate and spontaneous advance. Even though the indunas would lose control over the advance, the warriors' training allowed the Zulu troops to form their standard attack formation on the run, their battle line deployed in reverse of its intended order.

Battle

Prince Ntshingwayo
The Zulu Army was commanded by inDunas (Princes) Ntshingwayo kaMahole Khoza and inDuna Dabulamanzi kaMpande, half brother of Cetshwayo, would command the Undi Corps after kaMapitha, the regular inkhosi, or commander, was wounded.


While Chelmsford was in the field seeking them, the entire Zulu army had outmanoeuvred him, moving behind his force with the intention of attacking the British Army on the 23rd. Pulleine had received reports of large forces of Zulus throughout the morning of the 22nd from 8:00am on.

Vedettes had observed Zulus on the hills to the left front, and Lt. Chard, while he was at the camp, observed a large force of several thousand Zulu moving to the British left around the hill of Isandlwana. Pulleine sent word to Chelmsford, which was received by the General between 9:00am and 10:00am.

The main Zulu force was discovered at around 11:00am by men of Lt. Charles Raw's troop of scouts, who chased a number of Zulus into a valley, only then seeing most of the 20,000 men of the main enemy force sitting in total quiet. This valley has generally been thought to be the Ngwebeni some 7 miles (11 km) from the British camp but may have been closer in the area of the spurs of Nqutu hill. Having been discovered, the Zulu force leapt to the offensive. Raw's men began a fighting retreat back to the camp and a messenger was sent to warn Pulleine.

The Zulu attack then developed in the traditional horns and chest of the buffalo, with the aim of encircling the British position. From Pulleine's vantage point in the camp, at first only the right horn and then the chest (centre) of the attack seemed to be developing.

Worth reading!










Pulleine sent out first one, then all six companies of the 24th Foot into an extended firing line, with the aim of meeting the Zulu attack head-on and checking it with firepower. Durnford's men, upon meeting elements of the Zulu centre, had retreated to a donga, a dried-out watercourse, on the British right flank where they formed a defensive line.

The Rocket Battery under Durnford's command, which was not mounted and dropped behind the rest of the force, was isolated and overrun very early in the engagement.

The two battalions of native troops were in Durnford's line; while all the officers and NCOs carried rifles, only one in 10 in the ranks was armed with a muzzle-loading musket with limited ammunition and many of them started to leave the battlefield at this point.

Pulleine only made one change to the original disposition after about 20 minutes of firing, bringing in the companies in the firing line slightly closer to the camp.

For an hour or so until after noon, the disciplined British volleys pinned down the Zulu centre, inflicting some casualties and causing the advance to stall. Indeed, morale remained high within the British line.

The Martini-Henry rifle was a powerful weapon and the men were experienced. Additionally, the shell fire of the Royal Artillery forced some Zulu regiments to take cover behind the reverse slope of a hill. Nevertheless, the left horn of the Zulu advance was moving to outflank and envelop the British right.

Durnford's men, who had been fighting the longest, began to withdraw and their rate of fire diminished. Durnford's withdrawal exposed the right flank of the British regulars, which, with the general threat of the Zulu encirclement, caused Pulleine to order a withdrawal back to the camp.

The regulars' retreat was performed with order and discipline and the men of the 24th conducted a fighting withdrawal into the camp. Durnford's retreat, however, exposed the flank of G Company, 2nd/24th, which was overrun relatively quickly.




An officer in advance from Chelmsford's force gave this eyewitness account of the final stage of the battle at about 3:00pm.

"In a few seconds we distinctly saw the guns fired again, one after the other, sharp. This was done several times - a pause, and then a flash – flash! The sun was shining on the camp at the time, and then the camp looked dark, just as if a shadow was passing over it. The guns did not fire after that, and in a few minutes all the tents had disappeared."

Nearly the same moment is described in a Zulu warrior's account.

"The sun turned black in the middle of the battle; we could still see it over us, or should have thought we had been fighting till evening. Then we got into the camp, and there was a great deal of smoke and firing. Afterwards the sun came out bright again."

The time of the solar eclipse on that day is calculated as 2:29pm.

The presence of large numbers of bodies grouped together suggests the resistance was more protracted than originally thought, and a number of desperate last stands were made. Evidence shows that many of the bodies, today marked by cairns, were found in several large groups around the camp — including one stand of around 150 men.

A Zulu account describes a group of the 24th forming a square on the neck of Isandlwana. Colonial cavalry, the NMP and the carbineers, who could easily have fled as they had horses, died around Durnford in his last stand, while nearby their horses were found dead on their picket rope.

What is clear is that the slaughter was complete in the area around the camp and back to Natal along the Fugitive's Drift. The fighting had been hand-to-hand combat and no quarter was given to the British regulars. The Zulus had been commanded to ignore the civilians in black coats and this meant that some officers, whose patrol dress was dark blue and black at the time, were spared and escaped.[

The British fought back-to-back with bayonet and rifle butt when their ammunition had finally been expended. A Zulu account relates the single-handed fight by the guard of Chelmsford's tent, a big Irishman of the 24th who kept the Zulus back with his bayonet until he was assegaied and the general's Union flag captured.

 Both the colours of the 2/24th were lost, while the Queen's colour of the 1/24th was carried off the field by Lieutenant Melvill on horseback but lost when he crossed the river, despite Lieutenant Coghill coming to his aid.

 *Both Melvill and Coghill were killed after crossing the river, and would receive posthumous Victoria Crosses in 1907 as the legend of their gallantry grew, and, after twenty-seven years of steady campaigning by the late Mrs. Melvill (who had died in 1906), on the strength of Queen Victoria being quoted as saying that 'if they had survived they would have been awarded the Victoria Cross.

Garnet Wolseley
 Garnet Wolseley, who would replace Chelmsford, felt otherwise at the time and stated, "I don't like the idea of officers escaping on horseback when their men on foot are being killed."

(See report from 24th Foot Regiment)

Of the 1,700-plus force of British troops and African auxiliaries, about 1,300 were killed, most of them Europeans, including field commanders Pulleine and Durnford.


Only five Imperial officers survived, and the 52 officers lost was the most lost by any British battalion up to that time. Amongst those killed was Surgeon Major Peter Shepherd, a first-aid pioneer.


The Natal Native Contingent lost some 400 men, and there were 240 lost from the group of 249 amaChunu African auxiliaries.

Perhaps the last to die was Gabangaye, the portly chief of the amaChunu Natal Native Contingent, who was given over to be killed by the udibi boys. The captured Natal Native Contingent soldiers were regarded as traitors by the Zulu and executed.

There was no casualty count of the Zulu losses by the British such as made in many of the other battles since they abandoned the field. Nor was there any count by the Zulu.

Modern historians have rejected and reduced the older unfounded estimates. Historians Lock and Quantrill estimate the Zulu casualties as "... perhaps between 1,500 and 2,000 dead.

Historian Ian Knight stated: "Zulu casualties were almost as heavy. Although it is impossible to say with certainty, at least 1,000 were killed outright in the assault..."

Some 1,000 Martini-Henry rifles, the two field artillery guns, 400,000 rounds of ammunition, three colours, most of the 2,000 draft animals and 130 wagons, impedimenta, such as tinned food, biscuits, beer, overcoats, tents and other supplies, were taken by the Zulu or left abandoned on the field.

Of the survivors, most were from the auxiliaries



The Zulus had lost around 1,000 killed, with various unconfirmed estimates for their wounded.
The Battle

Order of battle

The following order of battle was arrayed on the day.

British forces

No 2 Column

Commanding Officer: Brevet Colonel Anthony Durnford, RE
  • Staff – 2 officers, 1 NCO
  • 11th/7th Brigade, Royal Artillery – 1 officer, 9 NCOs and men with 2 7-pounder (3-inch) mountain guns deployed as field guns
  • Natal Native Horse (5 troops) – 5 officers, ca. 259 NCOs and men
  • 1st/1st Natal Native Contingent (2 companies) – 5 or 6 officers, ca. 240 NCOs and men
  • 2nd/1st Natal Native Contingent – 1 NCO

No 3 Column

Commanding Officer: Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Pulleine, 1st/24th Foot
  • Staff – 6 officers, 14 NCO and men
  • N/5th Brigade, Royal Horse Artillery – 2 officers, 70 NCOs and men
  • 5th Field Company, Royal Engineers – 3 men
  • 1st/24th Regiment of Foot (5 companies and band) – 14 officers, 402 NCOs and men
  • 2nd/24th Regiment of Foot (1 company and details) – 5 officers, 170 NCOs and men
  • 90th Regiment of Foot – 6 men
  • Army Service Corps – 3 men
  • Army Hospital Corps – 1 officer, 10 NCOs and men
  • Imperial Mounted Infantry (1 squadron) – 28 NCOs and men
  • Natal Mounted Police – 34 NCOs and men
  • Natal Carbineers – 2 officers, 26 NCOs and men
  • Newcastle Mounted Rifles – 2 officers, 15 NCOs and men
  • Buffalo Border Guard – 1 officer, 7 NCOs and men
  • Natal Native Pioneer Corps – 1 officer, 10 men
  • 1st/3rd Natal Native Contingent (2 companies) – 11 officers, ca. 200 NCOs and men
  • 2nd/3rd Natal Native Contingent (2 companies) – 9 officers, ca. 200 NCOs and men

Zulu forces

uDududu, uNokenke regiments, part uNodwengu corps – 3,000 to 4,000 men

umCijo, uKhandampevu, uThulwana regiments; part uNodwengu corps – 7,000 to 9,000 men

inGobamakhosi, uMbonambi, uVe regiments – 5,000 to 6,000 men

Undi corps, uDloko regiment – 4,000 to 5,000 men

Reasons for the outcome

Zulu perspective

The primary reason for the Zulu victory is that the Zulus, unlike the British, kept their main fighting force concentrated. Further, they made a very successful effort to conceal the advance and location of this force until they were within a few hours' striking distance of their enemy.

The British made no such efforts. Finally, when the location of the main Zulu Impi was discovered by British scouts, the Zulus, without hesitation, immediately advanced and attacked, achieving tactical surprise.

 This tactical surprise prevented the British, although they now had some warning of a Zulu advance, from concentrating their central column. It also left little time and gave scant information for Pulleine to organise a sufficient defence for his command.

The Zulus had outmanoeuvred Chelmsford, and their victory at Isandlwana was a decisive defeat of the British invasion that forced the main British force to retreat out of Zululand until a far larger British army could be shipped to South Africa for a second invasion.  

Recent historians, notably Lock and Quantrill in Zulu Victory, argue that from the Zulu perspective the theatre of operations included the diversions around Magogo Hills and Mangeni Falls and that these diversions, which drew more than half of Chelmsford's forces away from Isandlwana, were deliberate.

Also, the main Zulu force was not unexpectedly discovered in their encampment but was fully deployed and ready to advance on the British camp. These historians' view of the expanded battlefield considers Chelmsford to be the overall commander of the British forces, and that responsibility for the defeat lies firmly with him.
Chelmsford arriving Isandhlawana

British perspective


Debate persists as to how and why the British lost the battle. Many arguments focus on possible local tactical occurrences, as opposed to the strategic lapses and failings in grand tactics on the part of high command under Bartle Frere and Chelmsford.

Still, the latter comes under scrutiny for mistakes that may have led directly to the British defeat.

British tactical failings

  • The initial view, reported by Horace Smith-Dorrien, was that the British had difficulty unpacking their ammunition boxes fast enough and that the quartermasters were reluctant to distribute ammunition to units other than their own. Well-equipped and well-trained British soldiers could fire 10–12 rounds a minute. The lack of ammunition caused a lull in the defence and, in subsequent engagements with the Zulus, ammunition boxes were unscrewed in advance for rapid distribution. Numerous first hand accounts indicate ammunition was available and being supplied, including Smith-Dorrien's earliest in a letter to his father.
  • Donald Morris in The Washing of the Spears argues that the men, fighting too far from the camp, ran out of ammunition, starting first with Durnford's men who were holding the right flank and who had been in action longer, which precipitated a slowdown in the rate of fire against the Zulus. This argument suggests that the ammunition was too far from the firing line and that the seventy rounds each man took to the firing line was not sufficient.
  •  different view, supported with evidence from the battlefield, such as Ian Knight and Lt. Colonel Snook's works, (the latter having written How Can Man Die Better?), suggest that, although Durnford's men probably did run out of ammunition, the majority of men in the firing line did not. The discovery of the British line so far out from the camp has led Ian Knight to conclude that the British were defending too large a perimeter.
  • The official interrogation by Horse Guards under the direction of the Duke of Cambridge, the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief, in August 1879 concluded that the primary cause of the defeat was the "under estimate formed of the offensive fighting power of the Zulu army", additionally the investigation questions Chelmsford as to why the camp was not laagered and why there was a failure to reconnoitre and discover the nearby Zulu army.
  • Colenso calls Chelmsford's neglecting to follow his own "Regulations for Field Forces in South Africa", which required that a defensible camp be established at every halt, fatal.

British command failings

Numerous messages, some quite early in the day, had been sent to Chelmsford informing him, initially, of the presence of the Zulu near the camp and, subsequently, of the attack on the camp, with increasingly urgent pleas for help.

The most egregious failure to respond occurred at around 1:30 pm when a message from Hamilton-Browne stating, "For God's sake come back, the camp is surrounded, and things I fear are going badly", was received by Lieutenant-Colonel Harness Royal Artillery and Major Black of the 2/24.

They were leading the other four RA guns as well as two companies of the 2/24 and on their own initiative immediately marched back towards Isandlwana and had gone some two miles when they were ordered to return to Mangeni Falls by an aide sent by Chelmsford.

At long last but too late, finally Chelmsford became convinced of the seriousness of the situation on his left flank and rear when at 3:30pm he joined Hamilton-Browne's NNC and realised the camp had been taken.

A surviving officer, Rupert Lonsdale, rode up and described the camp's fall to which Chelmsford replied, "But I left over 1,000 men to guard the camp".

He quickly gathered his scattered forces and marched the column back to Isandlwana but arrived at sundown long after the battle ended and the Zulu army had marched off.

The British camped on the field that night but left before sunrise without any examination of the ground as Chelmsford felt that it would demoralize his troops.

The column then proceeded to Rorke's Drift.                

Aftermath

Impact

Field Marshal Lord Wolseley

Though Isandlwana was a disaster for the British, the Zulu victory did not end the war. With the decisive defeat of Chelmsford's central column, the entire invasion of Zululand collapsed and would have to be restaged. Not only were there heavy manpower casualties to the Main Column, but most of the supplies, ammunition and draught animals were lost.

 As King Cetshwayo feared, the embarrassment of the defeat would force the policy makers in London, who to this point had not supported the war, to rally to the support of the pro-war contingent in the Natal government and commit whatever resources were needed to defeat the Zulus. Despite local numerical superiority, the Zulus did not have manpower, technological resources or logistical capacity to match the British in another, more extended, campaign.

The Zulus missed a tremendous opportunity to exploit their victory and possibly win the war that day on their own territory. The reconnaissance force under Chelmsford was more vulnerable to being defeated by an attack than the camp. It was strung out and somewhat scattered, it had marched with limited rations and ammunition it could not now replace, and it was panicky and demoralized by the defeat at Isandlwana.

Near the end of the battle, about 4,000 Zulu warriors of the unengaged reserve Undi impi, after cutting off the retreat of the survivors to the Buffalo River southwest of Isandlwana, crossed the river and attacked the fortified mission station at Rorke's Drift.

The station was defended by only 139 British soldiers, who nonetheless inflicted considerable casualties and repelled the attack. Elsewhere, the left and right flanks of the invading forces were now isolated and without support.

The No. 1 column under the command of Charles Pearson would be besieged for two months by a Zulu force at Eshowe, while the No. 4 column under Evelyn Wood halted its advance and spent most of the next two months skirmishing in the northwest around Tinta's Kraal.

Following Isandlwana and Rorke's Drift, the British and Colonials were in complete panic over the possibility of a counter invasion of Natal by the Zulus.

 All the towns of Natal 'laagered' up and fortified and provisions and stores laid in. Bartle Frere stoked the fear of invasion despite the fact that, aside from Rorke's Drift, the Zulus made no attempt to cross the border.

 Immediately following the battle, Zulu Prince Ndanbuko urged them to advance and take the war into the colony but they were restrained by a commander, kaNthati, reminding them of Cetshwayo's prohibiting the crossing the border.

Unknown to the inhabitants of Natal, Cetshwayo, still hoping to avoid a total war, had prohibited any crossing of the border in retaliation and was incensed over the violation of the border by the attack on Rorke's Drift.

The British government's reasoning for a new invasion was threefold. The first was jingoistic to a degree and national honor demanded that the enemy, victors in one battle, should lose the war.

The second concerned the domestic political implications at the next parliamentary elections.

However, despite the new invasion, the British Prime Minister Disraeli and his party were to lose the 1880 election.

 Finally, there were considerations affecting the Empire: unless the British were seen to win a clear-cut victory against the Zulus, it would send a signal that the British Empire was vulnerable and that the defeat of a British field army could alter policy.

If the Zulu victory at Isandlwana encouraged resistance elsewhere in the Empire, then committing the resources necessary to defeat the Zulus would, in the long term, prove cheaper than fighting wars that the Zulu success inspired against British Imperialism elsewhere.

After Isandlwana, the British field army was heavily reinforced and again invaded Zululand. Sir Garnet Wolseley was sent to take command and relieve Chelmsford, as well as Bartle Frere.

Chelmsford, however, avoided handing over command to Wolseley and managed to defeat the Zulus in a number of engagements, the last of which was the Battle of Ulundi, followed by capture of King Cetshwayo. With the fall of the Disraeli's government, Bartle Frere was recalled in August of 1880 and the policy of Confederation was abandoned.

The British encouraged the subkings of the Zulus to rule their subkingdoms without acknowledging a central Zulu power. By the time King Cetshwayo was allowed to return home, there was no longer an independent Zulu kingdom.

The measure of respect that the British gained for their opponents as a result of Isandlwana can be seen in that in none of the other engagements of the Zulu War did the British attempt to fight again in their typical linear formation, known famously as the Thin Red Line, in an open-field battle with the main Zulu impi. In the battles that followed, the British, when facing the Zulu, entrenched themselves or formed very close-order formations, such as the square.

Recriminations


Chelmsford realised that he would need to account to the government and to history for the disaster.

He quickly fixed blame on Durnford, claiming Durnford disobeyed his orders to fix a proper defensive camp, although there is no evidence such an order was issued and there would hardly have been time for Durnford to entrench. Further, it had been Chelmsford's decision not to entrench the camp, as it was meant to be temporary.

Wolseley wrote on 30 September 1879 when, later in the war, the Prince Imperial of France was killed by the Zulu: "I think this is very unfair, and is merely a repetition of what was done regarding the Isandlwana disaster where the blame was thrown upon Durnford, the real object in both instances being apparently to screen Chelmsford."








Later, Chelmsford launched a new and successful campaign in Zululand, routing the Zulu army, capturing the Royal Kraal of Ulundi, and thus partially retrieving his reputation. He never held another field command.

Following the war and his return to Britain, Chelmsford sought an audience with Gladstone, who had become Prime Minister in April 1880, but his request was refused, a very public slight and a clear sign of official disapproval.

Chelmsford, however, obtained an audience with Queen Victoria to personally explain the events.

She asked Gladstone to meet Chelmsford; this meeting was brief, and during it Gladstone voiced his displeasure.




      

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Isandlwana.mov         Ian Knight, historian in a Youtube presentation 
                                                          .https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lR_YVMjeJsc

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List of sources associated with the Wiki-pedia 

See also

  • Bambatha Rebellion
  • Battle of Adwa
  • Battle of Blood River
  • Battle of Rorke's Drift
  • British military history
  • Colony of Natal
  • List of Zulu War Victoria Cross recipients
  • Martini-Henry
  • Military history of South Africa
  • Natal Native Contingent

References

  • Colenso, Frances E.; (assisted in those portions of the work that touch on military matters by Lieut.-Colonel Edward Durnford) (1880). History of the Zulu War and Its Origin. London: Chapman and Hall. ISBN 1-152-31729-6. Google books
  • Doyle, Peter; Bennett, Matthew R.. Fields of Battle, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002, ISBN 1-4020-0433-8, essay by Tony Pollard The Mountain is their Monument, pp. 118 ff
  • Gump, James O. (1996). The Dust Rose Like Smoke: The Subjugation of the Zulu and the Sioux. Bison Books. ISBN 0-8032-7059-3.
  • Knight, Ian; Castle, Ian (1992). Zulu War 1879, Twilight of a Warrior Nation. Osprey. ISBN 1-85532-165-3.
  • Knight, Ian (2002). Isandlwana 1879: The Great Zulu Victory. Osprey. ISBN 1-84176-511-2.
  • Knight, Ian (2003). The Anglo-Zulu War. Osprey. ISBN 1-84176-612-7.
  • Knight, Ian; Castle, Ian (2004). Zulu War. Osprey. ISBN 1-84176-858-8.
  • Laband, John (2009). Historical Dictionary of the Zulu Wars. Scarecrow Press. ISBN 0-8108-6078-3.
  • Lock, Ron; Quantrill, Peter (2002). Zulu Victory: The Epic of Isandlwana and the Cover-up. Johannesburg & Cape Town: Jonathan Ball Publishers. ISBN 1-86842-214-3.
  • Mitford, Bertrand (1883). Through the Zulu Country. London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co.[1]
  • Morris, Donald R. The Washing of the Spears: A History of the Rise of the Zulu Nation under Shaka and Its Fall in the Zulu War of 1879 Da Capo Press, 1998, ISBN 0-306-80866-8.
  • Smith-Dorrien, Horace. Memories of Forty-eight Years Service, London, 1925.
  • Spiers, Edward M. . The Scottish Soldier and Empire, 1854–1902, Edinburgh University Press, 2006.
  • Thompson, Paul Singer (2006). Black soldiers of the queen: the Natal native contingent in the Anglo-Zulu War. University of Alabama Press. ISBN 0-8173-5368-2.

Further reading


  • Clarke, Sonia The Invasion of Zululand, Johannesburg, 1979.
  • Coupland, Sir Reginald Zulu Battle Piece: Isandhlwana, London, 1948.
  • David, Saul (February 2009). "The Forgotten Battles of the Zulu War". BBC History Magazine 10 (2). pp. 26–33.
  • Furneaux, R.. The Zulu War: Isandhlwana & Rorke's Drift W&N (Great Battles of History Series), 1963.
  • The London Gazette: no. 24695. p. 2199. 14 March 1879. Retrieved 13 June 2013.
  • Greaves, Adrian. Isandlwana, Cassell & Co, 2001, ISBN 0-304-35700-6.
  • Greaves, Adrian. Rorke's Drift, Cassell & Co., 2003 ISBN 0-304-36641-2.
  • Jackson, F.W.D. Hill of the Sphinx London, 2002.
  • Jackson, F.W.D. and Whybra, Julian Isandhlwana and the Durnford Papers, (Journal of the Victorian Military Society, March 1990, Issue 60).
  • Knight, Ian Brave Men's Blood, London, 1990. ISBN 1-84415-212-X.
  • Knight, Ian Zulu, (London, 1992)
  • Knight, Ian Zulu Rising, London, 2010. ISBN 0-330-44593-6.
  • Whybra, Julian. England's Sons, Billericay, (7th ed.), 2010.



This is how our great grandfather's read of the deaths, in the Australian Papers of 1879


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Lord Chelmsford returned on the night of 22 January. Nearly 1,400 British and allied troops, together with a 2,000 Zulus, and the carcasses of hundreds of slaughtered oxen, horses, mules and dogs were strewn across the veld. As one Zulu veteran commented years afterwards, “the green grass was red with the running blood and the veld was slippery, for it was covered with the brains and entrails of the killed.
Lord Chelmsford's troops were forced to bivouac amongst the battle dead. That night, as they rested at the foot of the Isandlwana rocky outcrop, they could hear the sounds and see the flames of battle at Rorke's Drift.
Lord Chelmsford, who was by now about 11km away had two indications that the camp was being attacked, but due to the hilly terrain had a poor view of the theatre of action. Unable to see anything amiss he apparently discounted both reports. One of the standard orders for the British, when attacked in camp, was to loosen the guy ropes on the tents so that soldiers would not get tangled up in them.
 This was not done and the upright tents were visible in the field glasses of the young officers with Lord Chelmsford. Lord Chelmsford took this to be an indication that the camp was not under attack and that the shots which could be heard in the distance were firing practice.
Even when the Zulu main attack started it was assumed that the Zulu impi which could be seen chasing Colonel Durnford's cavalry was the Natal Native Contingent being drilled.
www.southafricaholiday.org.uk/history/hist_isandlwana.htm

1 comment:

  1. War is a fascinating subject. Despite the dubious morality of using violence to achieve personal or political aims. It remains that conflict has been used to do just that throughout recorded history.

    Your article is very well done, a good read.

    ReplyDelete